Abstract. Certificateless public-key systems (CL-PKS) were introduced to simultaneously solve two critical problems in public-key systems. One is the key escrow problem in ID-based public-key systems and the other is to eliminate the presence of certificates in conventional public-key systems. In the last decade, several certificateless signature (CLS) schemes have been proposed in the random oracle model. These CLS schemes possess existential unforgeability against adaptive chosenmessage attacks, and only few of them possess strong unforgeability. A CLS scheme with strong unforgeability plays an important role in the construction of certificateless cryptographic schemes. Unfortunately, all the existing CLS schemes in the standard model (without random oracles) have been shown insecure to provide existential unforgeability under a generally adopted security model. In the article, we propose a strongly secure CLS scheme in the standard model under the generally adopted security model. Our scheme possesses not only existential unforgeability but also strong unforgeability, and turns out to be the first strongly secure CLS scheme in the standard model. Under the collision resistant hash (CRH) and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumptions, we prove that our CLS scheme possesses strong unforgeability against both Type I (outsiders) and Type II (key generation center) adversaries.
Introduction
proposed a prominent opinion for public-key cryptography, called identity (ID)-based public-key cryptography (ID-PKC), to simplify public-key management. The first practical ID-based cryptographic scheme (i.e., ID-based encryption) with bilinear maps is constructed by Boneh and Franklin (2001) . Afterward, the design of ID-based cryptographic mechanisms has undergone quite rapid progress, and enormous literatures have been presented such as (Waters, 2005; Tseng and Tsai, 2012; Tseng et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2012 Tsai et al., , 2014b Tsai et al., , 2014c . In ID-PKC setting, the public key of a user is the combination of her/his name, e-mail address, social security number, IP address or other identity information while the private key of the user is generated and issued securely by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG) . ID-PKC eliminates certificate management needed in conventional public-key cryptography. However, ID-PKC suffers from the key escrow problem in the sense that the PKG knows the private key of every user so that the PKG can decrypt ciphertexts or sign messages on behalf of any user.
To resolve the key escrow problem in ID-PKC, Al-Riyami and Paterson (2003) devised a new paradigm called certificateless public-key cryptography (CL-PKC). In CL-PKC setting, a semi-trusted third party, called key generation center (KGC), generates the partial private keys of users. The full private key of a user consists of a partial private key generated by the KGC and a secret key chosen randomly by the user. Meanwhile, the public key of the user is generated by using the secret key, and is published. The KGC has no access to the full private key of any user since the secret key is generated randomly by the user herself/himself. Hence, the key escrow problem is resolved. Subsequently, enormous CL-PKC schemes have been proposed such as certificateless public-key encryption (CL-PKE) (Libert and Quisquater, 2006; Dent, 2008; Yang and Tan, 2011) and certificateless signature (CLS) (Yum and Lee, 2004; Huang et al., 2005 Huang et al., , 2007 Hu et al., 2006; Zhang and Zhang, 2008; He et al., 2012; Tso et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2014a) .
Related Work
Al-Riyami and Paterson (2003) presented a security model for CL-PKC. The model has two types of adversaries: Type I (outsiders) and Type II (KGC) adversaries. Type I adversary represents a malicious outsider and Type II adversary represents an honest-butcurious KGC. Al-Riyami and Paterson also proposed the first concrete CLS scheme in the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) but did not present the security notions for CLS schemes. In 2005, Huang et al. (2005) pointed out that Al-Riyami and Paterson's CLS scheme is insecure against Type I adversary, and presented security notions for CLS schemes. Hu et al. (2006) enhanced the security notions of Huang et al. (2005) to permit adversaries more query capabilities. Since then, Hu et al.' s security model is generally adopted to formalize the security notions for CLS schemes. To improve the performance of signing and verifying, several CLS schemes (Gorantla and Saxena, 2005; Cao et al., 2006; Zhang and Zhang, 2008; Zhang and Mao, 2007) were constructed and analyzed. For reducing communication cost, Huang et al. (2007) proposed a certificateless short signature scheme, but Shim (2009) proved that their scheme is insecure against key replacement attacks. Cheng et al. (2013) wrote a survey article on security models for CLS schemes and presented eight potential security models according to activities and behaviors of adversaries. In particular, strong unforgeability is included in some of the eight potential security models.
The security proofs of these CLS schemes mentioned above must rely on the usage of the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) . However, when random oracles in real implementation are adopted with some hash functions such as SHA-1, these CLS schemes could be insecure. To overcome this problem, Liu et al. (2007) proposed the first CLS scheme without random oracles based on the ID-based signature proposed by Paterson and Schuldt (2006) . Unfortunately, Xiong et al. (2008) pointed out that the Liu et al.'s scheme is insecure against the attacks of Type II adversary, and proposed an improved scheme. In addition, Yuan et al. (2009) also proposed a new CLS scheme in the standard model. Later, Xia et al. (2012) presented that both schemes of Xiong et al. and Yuan et al. are vulnerable to key replacement attacks. Quite recently, Yu et al. (2012) proposed a new CLS scheme in the standard model. However, Cheng et al. (2013) presented that Yu et al.' s scheme is still insecure against both the KGC and the key replacement attacks under the generally adopted security model of Hu et al. (2006) .
Contributions
The CLS schemes in the standard model mentioned above have been shown to be insecure under Hu et al.' s security model. In addition, these schemes did not concern with strongly unforgeable property. A signature scheme is said to be strongly unforgeable (Boneh et al., 2006) if the signature is existentially unforgeable and, given a signature on some message m, an adversary cannot generate a new signature on m. Indeed, CLS schemes with strong unforgeability are important for constructing certificateless cryptographic schemes such as chosen-ciphertext secure certificateless cryptosystems, certificateless signcryption certificateless group signatures and so forth. In the article, we propose a strongly secure CLS scheme in the standard model. Our scheme possesses not only existential unforgeability but also strong unforgeability, while retaining effiency when compared with previously proposed CLS schemes in the standard model. Our scheme turns out to be the first CLS scheme with strong unforgeability in the standard model. Under the collision resistant hash (CRH) and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumptions, we prove that our CLS scheme possesses strong unforgeability against both Type I (outsiders) and Type II (KGC) adversaries.
Organization
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the framework and security notions for strongly secure CLS schemes. Our concrete scheme is given in Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze the security of our scheme. Comparisons are presented in Section 6. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In the section, we briefly review fundamental facts of bilinear pairings and two related security assumptions. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , where G 1 and G 2 are two multiplicative cyclic groups of large prime order p. Additionally, a bilinear pairing is an admissible bilinear map if it possesses three properties, namely, bilinear, nondegeneracy and computable (Boneh and Franklin, 2001; Tsai et al., 2014b) . In the following, we first present a mathematical problem and its corresponding security assumption.
D
1. (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem and assumption). Given a cyclic multiplicative group G 1 of large prime order p with generator g and g a , g b ∈ G 1 with unknown a, b ∈ Z * p , the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G 1 is to obtain g ab . We say that the (ǫ, t)-CDH assumption holds in the group G 1 if no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A running in time at most t can solve the CDH problem in G 1 with probability at least ǫ. The advantage of A is denoted as Pr[A(g, g a , g b ) = g ab ], where the advantage is based on the random instances chosen by A.
In our scheme, we use collision-resistant hash (CRH) functions to construct our strongly secure CLS scheme, in which the CRH functions can be easily obtained based on the CDH assumption (Boneh et al., 2006) . So, the usage of the CRH functions does not strengthen the security assumption of our scheme.
2. (Collision-resistant hashing (CRH) assumption.) Let H k : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n be a family of CRH functions, where k is an index and n is a fixed bit length. We say that the (ǫ, t)-CRH assumption holds if no PPT adversary A running in time at most t can break the collision resistance of H k with probability at least ǫ. The advantage of A is denoted as Pr[
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Framework
We present the framework of CLS schemes with strong unforgeability (or called strongly secure CLS schemes), which is identical to that of the CLS schemes in Hu et al. (2006) , Yu et al. (2012) , Cheng et al. (2013) . A strongly secure CLS scheme consists of two kinds of entities, namely, users and key generation center (KGC). A strongly secure CLS is specified by five algorithms, namely, the system setup, the partial private key extract, the user key generation, the signing and the verifying algorithms.
-System setup: On input a security parameter, the KGC runs this algorithm to return the master secret key and public parameters PP. PP is available for all the other algorithms. (verifier) , takes as input a signature σ , a message M, a user identity ID with the public key PK ID , the algorithm outputs either "accept" or "reject".
Adversarial Model
Based on the security models in Huang et al. (2005) , Hu et al. (2006) , Cheng et al. (2013) , we present the security notions for strongly secure CLS schemes. We present two types of adversaries, namely, Type I and Type II adversaries. A Type I adversary acts as a dishonest user (outsider) who can replace the public key of any entity with a value of her/his choice, but has no access to the master secret key. A Type II adversary represents an honest-butcurious KGC that owns the master secret key, but cannot perform public key replacement. The security notions for strongly secure CLS schemes are modeled using the following games (Games I and II) between a challenger B and two types of adversaries.
Game 1 (for Type I Adversary A, Outsider)
• Setup. The challenger B takes a security parameter ψ and runs the system setup algorithm to produce the master secret key and public parameters PP. PP is given to A and the master secret key is kept by B.
• Queries. The Type I adversary A performs the following queries adaptively:
-Public key retrieve (ID). When A requests the public key of an entity ID, the challenger B runs the user key generation algorithm to obtain the public key PK ID and returns it to A. -Public key replace (ID, P K ′ ID ). The adversary A replaces the public key of a user with identity ID by PK ID . B records this replacement.
-Partial private key extract (ID). When A requests the partial private key of an entity ID, B runs the partial private key extract algorithm to obtainD ID and returns it to A. -Secret key extract (ID). When A requests the secret key of an entity ID, B runs the user key generation algorithm to obtain the secret key SK ID and returns it to A. Here, B returns the symbol ⊥ if the identity ID has already appeared in the public key replace query. -Signing (ID, M). When A requests a signature on the message M for an entity ID, B uses the current partial private key D ID and secret key SK ID to run the signing algorithm to obtain a signature on the message M. Note that, no matter whether the public key of the identity ID has not been replaced or not, B then returns to A.
• Forgery. A generates a signature tuple (ID * , M * , σ * ). We say that A win the game if the following conditions holds:
(1) (ID * , M * , σ * ) can pass the verifying algorithm. (2) (ID * , M * , σ * ) has never appeared during the signing query. (3) ID * has never been submitted in the partial private key extract query.
Game 2 (for Type II Adversary, KGC)
• Setup. The challenger B takes a security parameter ψ and runs the system setup algorithm to produce the master secret key and public parameters PP. The master secret key and PP are given to the adversary A.
• Queries. The adversary A may issue queries defined in Game 1, except for the public key replace query, in an adaptive manner. A has no need to request the partial private key extract query since it owns the master secret key. Note that it is unreasonable to ask B to respond the signing queries if the public key of the entity ID has been replaced.
has never been appeared during the signing query. 3. ID * has never been submitted in the secret key extract query.
A CLS scheme with strong unforgeability is said to be strongly secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in Games 1 and 2. R 1. Note that, for existential unforgeability in CLS schemes, the condition (2) in the Forgery phase of both Games I and II is, instead, weakened as that (ID * , M * ) has never been submitted during the signing query. Hence, strong unforgeability offers adversaries more capabilities than existential unforgeability does.
Strongly Secure CLS Scheme
In this section, we present a concrete CLS scheme with strong unforgeability in the standard model that consists of the following algorithms:
-Setup: Given a security parameter ψ, the KGC selects two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of a prime order p > 2 ψ . Let g be a generator of G 1 andê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be an admissible bilinear map. The KGC selects α ∈ Z * p and g 2 ∈ G 1 at random, computes g 1 = g α ∈ G 1 , and sets the master secret key as g α 2 . The KGC also selects five collision-resistant hash functions
p , where m, n and l are fixed lengths. Furthermore, the KGC randomly selects u i , u ′ , s j , s ′ , t j , t ′ , w k , w ′ ∈ G 1 and four vectors u = (u i ), s = (s j ), t = (t j ) and w = (w k ) of length m, n, n and l, respectively. The KGC publishes
. . , v m ) be a bit string of length m representing a user's identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * . To construct the user's partial private key D ID , the KGC selects a random value r v ∈ Z * p and computes
i . The KGC transmits D ID to the user by way of a secure channel.
-User key generation: On input a user's identity ID, this algorithm randomly chooses two secret values θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ Z * p , and computes the user's public key PK ID = (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (g θ 1 , g θ 2 ), − → vs = H 2 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vs 1 , . . . , vs n ) and − → vt = H 3 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vt 1 , . . . , vt n ), where − → vs and − → vt are two bit strings of length n. Finally, the user's secret key is SK ID = g θ 1 2 S θ 1 T θ 2 , where S = s ′ n j =1 s vs j j and T = t ′ n j =1 t vt j j . -Signing: Given a user's D ID , SK ID and M, the signer selects a random number r m ∈ Z * p , and computes − → vm = H 4 (M) = (vm 1 , vm 2 , . . . , vm l ) and h = H 5 (M||g r m ). A signature σ on the message M is constructed by computing
where W = (w ′ l k=1 w vm k k ). -Verifying: Given a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ), the message M, identity ID and its associated public key PK ID = (PK 1 , PK 2 ), a verifier accepts the signature if the following equality holds:
Correctness. We present that the equality in the verifying algorithm is correct as follows:
Security Analysis
In this section, we establish two theorems to prove that our CLS scheme possesses strong unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the CRH and CDH assumptions for both Type I (in Game 1) and Type II (in Game 2) adversaries defined in Section 3. 
to violate the CDH assumption or a advantage ǫ ′′ ǫ 4 to violate the CRH assumption within a running time
where τ 1 and τ 2 are the computational costs of a scalar multiplication and an exponentiation in G 1 , respectively.
Proof. Suppose that a Type I adversary A may forge a valid signature to our CLS scheme, then we can establish an algorithm B to resolve the CDH problem or find a collision pair for the CRH assumption. We assume that B is given an instance of the CDH problem with G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g, g a , g b . The algorithm B simulates the challenger in Game 1 to respond A as follows.
Setup. The challenger B chooses five CRH functions
where m, n and l are fixed lengths. The adopted CRH functions do not act as random oracles in the following proof. B sets l v = 2(q E +q S ), l s = q K and l m = 2q S , and choose three random integers k v , k s and k m , where 0 k v m, 0 k s n and 0 k m l. For the given values of q E , q S , m, n and l, the following inequalities l v (m + 1) < p, l s (n + 1) < p and l m (l + 1) < p must hold. B selects the following random integers:
As in our scheme, we have v = H 1 (ID) = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) for an identity ID, − → vs = H 2 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vs 1 , . . . , vs n ) and − → vt = H 3 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vt 1 , . . . , vt n ) for a public key PK ID = (PK 1 , PK 2 ), and − → vm = H 4 (M) = (vm 1 , . . . , vm l ) for a message M. We then construct six functions F , J , Q, E, K and L as follows:
B constructs public parameters PP by computing
, s j = g r j 2 for 1 j n; t ′ = g z ′ , t j = g z j for 1 j n; w ′ = g
For reducing complexity of the cumbersome notations mentioned above, we also conclude with four relations which will be frequently used in the sequel, namely,
Queries. To avoid collision and consistently respond to queries, B maintains a list L of tuples ID, θ 1 , θ 2 , PK ID , SK ID , which is initially empty. The challenger B responds to A's queries in an adaptive manner as follows:
-Public key retrieve (ID): When A makes this query on ID, the challenger B does as follows:
(1) If the list L contains ID, B returns the corresponding PK ID to A.
(2) Otherwise, B chooses two secret values θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ Z * p and computes the public key PK ID = (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (g θ 1 , g θ 2 ), − → vs = H 2 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vs 1 , . . . , vs n ), − → vt = H 3 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vt 1 , . . . , vt n ) and the secret key SK ID = g 
It is convinced that D ID is a valid partial private key since
where 
. Then σ is a valid signature since
On the other hand, if F ( v) = 0 mod p, B selects two values r v , r m ∈ Z * p at random and responds with the signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ), where
, it is obvious that σ is a valid signature since
Case 2: Let us consider the case that ID has not appeared in the public key replace query. If F ( v) = 0, B can compute the partial private key D ID = (D 1 , D 2 ) as in the partial key extract query, and accesses the list L to obtain the secret key SK ID . B randomly selects a value r m ∈ Z * p and returns the signature
If F ( v) = 0 mod p, then B randomly selects two values r v , r m ∈ Z * p and returns the signature
Forgery. Suppose that A forges a valid signature σ * = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) for ID * on M * , where ID * and M * are the target identity and message, respectively. We discuss two cases.
Case 1: If (ID * , M * ) does not appear in the signing query, B accesses the list L to get PK ID * = (PK 1 , PK 2 ) and computes
as follows.
This solves the CDH problem.
Case 2: If (ID * , M * ) has appeared in the signing query, A owned a previously queried signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) of ID * on M * . If σ 2 = σ * 2 , the challenge B can output g ab as in Case 1. Otherwise, if σ 2 = σ * 2 , then g hr v = g h * r v and so h * = h. Namely, H 5 (M g r * m ) = H 5 (M g r m ) , where σ * 3 = g r * m and σ 3 = g r m . This causes a collision of H 5 which violates the CRH assumption.
In the following, we analyze the probabilities of the events that the challenger B does not abort. In the partial partial key extract query, if F ( v) = 0 mod p, B may respond to queries without aborting. In the signing query, if K( − → vm) = 0 mod p, B may respond to queries without aborting. In the forgery phase, if
B completes the simulation without aborting. We denote that q I represents the number of the identities queried in partial private key extract and signing queries not involving ID * . Meanwhile, q M represents the number of the messages queried in the signing involving ID * . It is obvious that we have q I < q E + q S and q M < q S . Here, we define several events as follows:
where 1 < i q I and 1 < k q M , Hence, the probabilities of B not aborting in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively, are
Since l v (m + 1) < p, l s (n + 1) < p and l m (l + 1) < p, we have that . . , c l are randomly chosen, we have the probabilities of the events X * , Y * and Z * as follows.
We then have that
We also have
and Pr
by independency, hence we can obtain that
As mentioned earlier, we have set l v = 2(q E + q S ), l s = q K and l m = q S . Hence, the probabilities of B not aborting in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively,
Hence, if A with an advantage ǫ can break the proposed CLS scheme, B has an advantage
to violate the CDH assumption or a advantage ǫ ′′ ǫ 4 to violate the CRH assumption. According to the descriptions above, B requires O(m) scalar multiplications and O(1) exponentiations in the private partial key extract queries. In both public key replace and secret key extract queries, O(n) scalar multiplications and O(1) exponentiations are required. In the signing queries, B requires O(m + n + l) scalar multiplications and O(1) exponentiations. So, the total running time required for B is
, where τ , τ 1 and τ 2 are A's running time, the computational costs of a scalar multiplication and an exponentiation, respectively. Proof. Suppose that a Type II adversary A may forge a valid signature to our CLS scheme, then we can establish an algorithm B to resolve the CDH problem or find a collision pair for the CRH assumption. We assume that B is given an instance of the CDH problem with G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g, g a , g b . The algorithm B simulates the challenger in Game 2 to respond A as follows.
Theorem 2. Under the CDH and CRH assumptions, our CLS
Setup. As the Setup phase in Theorem 1, the challenger B first chooses five CRH functions. B then sets l m = 2q S , and selects a random integer k m , where 0 k m l. We suppose that l m (l + 1) < p for the given values of q S and l. B selects the following random integers: y ′ , y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ Z p , r ′ , r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p , z ′ , z 1 , . . . , z n ∈ Z p , c ′ , c 1 , . . . , c l ∈ Z l m and d ′ , d 1 , . . . , d l ∈ Z p , and the following vectors u = (u i ), s = (s j ), t = (t j ) and w = (w k ) of the length m, n, n and l, respectively. Then, as the Setup phase in Theorem 1, B constructs v = H 1 (ID) = (v 1 , . . . , v m ), − → vs = H 2 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vs 1 , . . . , vs n ) and − → vt = H 3 (PK 1 , PK 2 ) = (vt 1 , . . . , vt n ), and − → vm = H 4 (M) = (vm 1 , . . . , vm l ). We constructs five functions J , Q, E, K and L as follows:
The challenger B chooses a random value α ∈ Z p , and sets g 1 = g α and g 2 = g b . Furthermore, B computes and sends the master secret key g α 2 to the adversary A. B constructs public parameters PP by computing
For the cumbersome notations defined above, as the Setup phase in Theorem 1, we also have four notations U , S, T and W .
Queries. To avoid collision and consistently respond to queries, the challenger B maintains an initially empty list L of tuples ID, θ 1 , θ 2 , PK ID , SK ID . Moreover, B chooses a target identity ID ′ and a random value θ 2 ∈ Z * p . B computes the public key D 2 ) . B randomly selects a value r m ∈ Z * p and computes the signature
Let
Case 2: If ID = ID ′ , B performs the partial private key extract algorithm to get the partial private key
, and accesses the list L to obtain the secret key SK ID . B randomly selects a value r m ∈ Z * p and computes the signature
Forgery. Suppose that the adversary A generates a valid signature σ * = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) for ID * on M * , where ID * and M * are the target identity and message, respectively. We discuss two cases. 
By computing V (1+Q( − → vs * )) −1 , we obtain the value g ab . This solves the CDH problem.
Case 2: If (ID * , M * ) has appeared in the signing query, A owned a previously queried signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) of ID * on M * . If σ 2 = σ * 2 , the challenge B is able to output g ab as in Case 1. Otherwise, if σ 2 = σ * 2 , then g hr v = g h * r v and so h * = h. Namely,
, where σ * 3 = g r * m and σ 3 = g r m . This causes a collision of H 5 which violates the CRH assumption.
In the following, we analyze the probabilities of the events that the challenger B does not abort. In the signing query, if K( − → vm) = 0 mod p, B may respond to queries without aborting. In the forgery phase, if ID * = ID ′ and K( − → vm * ) = 0 mod p, B completes the simulation without aborting. We denote that q M represents the number of the messages in signing queries not involving ID * . It is obvious that we have q M < q S . Here, we define several events as follows:
Hence, the probabilities of the challenger B not aborting in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively, are 
With similar to the probability analysis in Theorem 1, we have to violate the CDH assumption or a probability ǫ ′′ ǫ 2 to violate the CRH assumption. According to the descriptions above, B requires O(n) scalar multiplications and O(1) exponentiations in secret key extract queries. In the signing queries, B requires O(m + n + l) scalar multiplications and O(1) exponentiations. Therefore, the total time required for B is τ ′ = τ + O((nq K + (m + n + l)q S )τ 1 + O(q K + q S )τ 2 , where τ , τ 1 and τ 2 are A's running time, the computational costs of a scalar multiplication and an exponentiation, respectively.
Comparisons
To analyze and compare the computational cost, we consider two time-consuming operations T p and T e , which, respectively, denote the time of executing a bilinear pairing operationê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 and the time of executing an exponentiation operation in G 1 or G 2 . Table 1 lists the comparisons among the schemes of Liu et al. (2007) , Yuan et al. (2009 and ours in terms of computational cost, security assumption and security property. All the signing phases of the schemes above require no pairing operation to sign a message. For the verifying phase, Yu et al. (2012) require five pairing operations but their scheme has been shown insecure against the Type I adversary.
For security analysis, the schemes of Liu et al. (2007) , Yuan et al. (2009) and Yu et al. (2012) have been shown insecure against the Type I adversary or Type II adversary. For the security assumption, our scheme is based on the CDH and CRH assumptions, but the others are based on non-pairing-based generalized bilinear Diffie-Hellman (NGBDH) (Liu (Lysyanskaya, 2002) , augmented computational Diffie-Hellman (AC-DH) and 2-many Diffie-Hellman (2-Many-DH) assumptions (Yuan et al., 2009) . For Type I and Type II adversaries, we emphasize that our scheme possesses strong unforgeability and is the first secure CLS scheme in the standard model.
Conclusions
Strongly secure CLS schemes are important for constructing certificateless cryptographic schemes such as chosen-ciphertext secure certificateless cryptosystems and certificateless group signatures. In this article, we proposed the first strongly secure CLS scheme in the standard model. Comparisons with previously proposed schemes were made to demonstrate the advantages of our scheme in terms of security property while retaining efficiency. For security analysis, under the CDH and CRH assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed CLS scheme possesses strong unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under a generally adopted security model.
